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Abstract
Within a country-size asymmetric monetary union, idiosyncratic shocks
and national fiscal stabilization policies cause asymmetric cross-border ef-
fects. These eﬀects are a source of strategic interactions between non-
coordinated fiscal and monetary policies: on the one hand, due to larger
externalities imposed on the union, large countries face less incentives
to develop free-riding fiscal policies; on the other hand, a larger strate-
gic position vis-à-vis the central bank incentives the use of fiscal policy
to, deliberately, influence monetary policy. Additionally, the existence
of non-distortionary government financing may also shape policy interac-
tions. As a result, optimal policy regimes may diverge not only across the
union members, but also between the latter and the monetary union.
In a two-country micro-founded New-Keynesian model for a monetary
union, we consider two fiscal policy scenarios: (i) lump-sum taxes are
raised to fully finance the government budget and (ii) lump-sum taxes do
not ensure balanced budgets in each period; therefore, fiscal and monetary
policies are expected to impinge on debt sustainability. For several de-
grees of country-size asymmetry, we compute optimal discretionary and
dynamic non-cooperative policy games and compare their stabilization
performance using a union-wide welfare measure. We also assess whether
these outcomes could be improved, for the monetary union, through in-
stitutional policy arrangements.
We find that, in the presence of government indebtedness, monetary
policy optimally deviates from macroeconomic to debt stabilization. We
also find that policy cooperation is always welfare increasing for the mon-
etary union as a whole; however, indebted large countries may strongly
oppose to this arrangement in favour of fiscal leadership. In this case,
delegation of monetary policy to a conservative central bank proves to be
fruitful to improve the union’s welfare.
Keywords: Monetary union; optimal fiscal and monetary policies; asymmet-
ric countries. JEL codes: C61; E62; E63
∗We thank Álvaro Aguiar and Tatiana Kirsanova for helpful comments on this work.
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1 Introduction
In the European Monetary Union (EMU), monetary policy is decided at a cen-
tralized level but fiscal policy is determined at the national level by each member
country’s government. Small and large countries coexist and are expected to
experience diﬀerent stabilization policy trade-oﬀs and to have diﬀerent interests
concerning institutional policy arrangements. In eﬀect, within a country-size
asymmetric monetary union, idiosyncratic shocks and national fiscal stabiliza-
tion policies cause asymmetric cross-border eﬀects. These spill-over eﬀects are
a source of strategic interactions between non-coordinated fiscal and monetary
policies: on the one hand, due to larger externalities imposed on the union, large
countries face less incentives to develop free-riding fiscal policies; on the other
hand, a larger strategic position vis-à-vis the central bank incentives the use
of fiscal policy to, deliberately, influence monetary policy. In turn, small coun-
tries face the opposite incentives. Additionally, the available mix of fiscal policy
instruments, namely if whether or not it includes non-distortionary sources of
government financing, is also critical in shaping monetary and fiscal policy in-
teractions. As a result, optimal stabilization policy regimes may diverge not
only across the union members, but also between the latter and the monetary
union as a whole. Institutional policy arrangements that would improve the
union’s welfare may lack support from the large countries.
In the context of these challenging research issues raised by country-size
asymmetry in a monetary union, our main objective is to characterize opti-
mizing stabilization policies in a monetary union when policymakers may act
strategically and to assess whether institutional policy arrangements, such as
policy cooperation or monetary policy delegation to a weight-conservative cen-
tral bank, can improve the stabilization outcomes. In particular, we intend to
examine how country-size asymmetry and the inexistence of non-distortionary
sources of government financing shape these outcomes and how they determine
possible recommendations on monetary and fiscal policy arrangements to be
applied, for instance, in the EMU context.
To address the above mentioned issues we begin by setting a baseline frame-
work: a two-country micro-founded macroeconomic model for a closed mone-
tary union with monopolistic competition and sticky prices, in line with the
ones firstly developed by Benigno (2004) for monetary policy analysis, and ex-
tended by Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005) to include fiscal policy. We consider
two scenarios for the framework of fiscal policy. In the first scenario lump-sum
taxes are raised to fully finance the government budget and, thus, monetary
policy does not interfere with the government sources of financing. In the sec-
ond scenario, lump-sum taxes do not ensure balanced budgets in each period;
therefore, fiscal and monetary policies are expected to impinge on debt sus-
tainability. Following the recent work of Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a, 2007b),
we allow the model to include two fiscal policy instruments yielding both de-
mand and supply-side eﬀects, respectively, home-biased government spending
and distortionary taxes.
We derive a welfare criterion to allow the derivation of optimal stabilization
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policies and the ranking of the alternative policy outcomes under diﬀerent strate-
gic set-ups. This relies on a quadratic approximation to the union-weighted av-
erage of the representative households’ welfare where linear terms are removed
through the use of a subsidy fully financed by lump-sum taxes, as in Rotemberg
and Woodford (1998), for instance.1
The characterization of optimal stabilization policies under non-cooperative
and dynamic settings requires the model to be solved numerically using ap-
propriate algorithms that reflect the various timing structures of the policy
games: Nash, monetary leadership and fiscal leadership. We follow the method-
ology developed in the recent work of Kirsanova and co-authors (Blake and
Kirsanova, 2006, for a closed-economy setup and Kirsanova et al., 2005, for
an open-economy setup) to find the leadership discretionary equilibrium with
dynamic rational expectations macroeconomic models.2
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the policy setup
for policy analysis, which includes the description of the economic structure,
the policy environment and the policy games, and calibration. In Section 3 we
perform policy analysis related with dynamic responses and welfare evaluation of
the diﬀerent policy regimes. Finally, in Section 4 we present concluding remarks
and suggest extensions for future work.
2 Setup for Policy Analysis
To capture strategic interactions between monetary and fiscal policies, we closely
follow Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005). The model is extended to capture
country-size asymmetry, to allow for a more generic case of cross-country con-
sumption elasticity and to include diﬀerent fiscal policy scenarios.
A monetary union is modelled as a closed area with two countries, H (home)
and F (foreign), populated by a continuum of agents ∈ [0, 1] . The population on
the segment [0, n) belongs to country H, while agents on [n, 1] live in country F.
The countries are assumed to have identical economic structures: each country is
characterized by two private sectors - households and firms -, one fiscal authority,
and is subject to a common monetary policy. Nevertheless, countries may face
idiosyncratic shocks.
1Benigno and Woodford (2004, 2005, 2006), for a closed-economy, and Ferrero (2007),
for a monetary union, present an alternative way to remove the linear terms of the social
loss function, in the presence of a distorted steady-state. They focus on timeless optimal
commitment policies and they need to compute second-order approximations to the structural
equations of the model to get a purely quadratic loss. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a,b),
Correia et al (2003) and Lambertini (2006) illustrate the so-called Ramsey approach, which
configures an alternative to the joint design of optimal policies. Neither of these approaches
is compatible with the study of the policy problem under discretion.
2Adam and Billi (2006), for a closed-economy setup, present an alternative computational
method that delivers second-order accurate welfare expressions for economies with a distorted
steady-state within the linear-quadratic approach.
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2.1 Households
Throughout this section we will address the optimization problem of the repre-
sentative Home (H)-household, bearing in mind that the representative Foreign
(F)-household behaves similarly. The representative H-household seeks to max-
imize the following lifetime utility (U j0 ).
U j0 = Et
∞X
t=0
βt
h
u
³
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H
t
´
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¡
GHt
¢
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³
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´i
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The index j refers to a specific household, while the index H refers to the country
H where j lives.
Each household delivers utility from consuming across a basket of home-
and foreign-produced goods
³
Cjt
´
, from own-country per capita government
consumption on domestically produced goods
¡
GHt
¢
, while she receives disutil-
ity from labour eﬀort (Ljt , measured in hours). C
H
is a bounded exogenous
disturbance3 and Cj is a real consumption Dixit-Stiglitz index defined (as in
Benigno and Benigno, 2006, or Lombardo and Sutherland, 2004) by
Cj ≡
·
n
1
ρ
³
CjH
´ ρ−1
ρ
+ (1− n)
1
ρ
³
CjF
´ ρ−1
ρ
¸ ρρ−1
(2)
In turn, CjH and C
j
F are also Dixit-Stiglitz indexes of consumption across a
continuum of diﬀerentiated goods produced, respectively, in country H and F:
CjH,t ≡
·¡
1
n
¢ 1
θ
Z n
0
cjt (h)
θ−1
θ dh
¸ θ
θ−1
; CjF,t ≡
·³
1
1−n
´ 1
θ
Z 1
n
cjt (f)
θ−1
θ df
¸ θθ−1
(3)
The elasticity of substitution between goods produced in each country (θ)
may diﬀer from the elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign con-
sumption baskets (ρ).
Maximization of (1) is, as usual, subject to a budget constraint. The flow
budget constraint for the representative Home household is
PtC
j
t +Et
³
Qt,t+1D
j
t+1
´
=Wt (j)L
j
t +
Z n
0
Π
j
t (z) dz − PtTHt +D
j
t (4)
3We introduce a country specific demand shock by letting the marginal utility of consump-
tion be stochastic.
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where P is the consumption-based price index defined below, W (j) is the nom-
inal wage rate of labour of type j, Πj (z) is the share of profits of domestic
firm z going to household j in country H and TH is a per capita lump sum tax
levied by the domestic government on its citizens. Household j has access to a
complete set of state-contingent securities that span all possible states of nature
and are traded across the union. Djt+1 denotes the nominal payoﬀ of a portfolio
of state-contingent securities, purchased by the representative home household
at date t, while Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one-period ahead
nominal payoﬀs, common across countries.
Assuming no trade barriers and given the structure of preferences, purchas-
ing power parity holds, and the underlying consumption-based price index (Pt)
is defined as
Pt ≡
h
nP 1−ρH,t + (1− n)P
1−ρ
F,t
i 1
1−ρ
, (5)
while the country-specific price indexes PH and PF are given by
PH,t ≡
·
1
n
Z n
0
pt (h)
1−θ dh
¸ 1
1−θ
; PF,t ≡
·
1
1− n
Z 1
n
pt (f)
1−θ df
¸ 1
1−θ
(6)
where p (h) and p (f) are the prices of typical goods h and f produced in country
H and F, respectively.
The problem of the representative household can be split into an intertempo-
ral and an intratemporal problem. In regards to the household’s intratemporal
problem, it requires choosing the allocation of a given level of expenditure across
the diﬀerentiated goods to maximize the consumption index, Cj . Plugging into
the appropriate output aggregators the resulting individual demands and the
optimal government spending allocation across domestically produced goods,
we obtain the national aggregate demands, Y H and Y F ,
Y Ht =
µ
PH,t
Pt
¶−ρ
CWt +G
H
t (7H)
Y Ft =
µ
PF,t
Pt
¶−ρ
CWt +G
F
t (7F)
where the union-wide consumption, CW , is defined as CW ≡
Z 1
0
Cjdj, and
µ
PH
P
¶ρ−1
= n+ (1− n)T 1−ρ ;
µ
PF
P
¶ρ−1
= nT ρ−1 + (1− n) (8)
The variable T stands for the terms-of-trade, defined as the relative price of the
F-bundle of goods in terms of the H-bundle of goods (T ≡ PF /PH). According
to (8), changes in the terms-of-trade imply a larger response in a country’s
aggregate demand the smaller the size of the country, i.e., the larger the degree
of openness.
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As for the household’s intertemporal problem, the household chooses the set
of processes
n
Cjt , L
j
t ;D
j
t+1
o∞
t=0
, taking as given all the other processes and the
initial wealth, as to maximize the intertemporal utility function (1) subject to
(4). Solution for this problem yields the familiar Euler equation
uc
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Cjt , C
H
t
´
= β (1 + it)Et
½µ
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Pt+1
¶
uc
³
Cjt+1, C
H
t+1
´¾
, (9)
where 1 + it = 1EtQt,t+1 is the gross risk-free nominal interest rate. Moreover,
assuming that the initial state-contingent distribution of nominal bonds is such
that the life-time budget constraints of all households are identical, the risk-
sharing condition implies that
uc
³
CHt , C
H
t
´
= uc
³
CFt , C
F
t
´
(10)
Finally, the labour supply decision determines that the real wage for labour type
j is given by
Wt (j)
Pt
= µHw,t ∗
vL
³
Ljt
´
uc
³
Cjt , C
H
t
´ (11)
where µHw,t > 1 is an exogenous Home-specific wage markup that is used as
a device to introduce the possibility of "pure cost-push shocks" that aﬀects
the equilibrium price behaviour but does not change the eﬃcient output, as in
Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2005).
2.2 Firms
There are a continuum of firms in country H and in country F . The production
function for the diﬀerentiated consumption good y, indexed by h ∈ [0, n) in
country H and by f ∈ [n, 1] in country F, is described, for y(h), by
yt (h) = aHt Lt (h) (12)
where aHt is an exogenous H-specific technology shock, common to all H-firms,
and Lt (h) is the firm-specific labour input oﬀered by a continuum of H-households,
indexed in the unit interval. In a symmetric equilibrium, the work eﬀort chosen
by the household
¡
Lht
¢
equals the aggregate labour input (Lt (h)).
To introduce price stickiness, we assume that firms set prices according to
the process defined in Calvo (1983). Each period, a randomly selected fraction
of firms at H, 1−αH , have the opportunity to change their prices, independently
of the time that has elapsed since the last price-resetting, while the remaining
firms keep the prices of the previous period. If it has the chance to reset prices
in period t, an optimizing h-firm will set pot (h) in order to maximize the ex-
pected future profits, subject to the demand for its product and the production
6
technology. The first order condition for this optimizing wage-taker firm can be
expressed as
µ
pot (h)
PH,t
¶1+θη
=
θ
θ−1Et
X∞
s=t
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αHβ
¢s−t
µHw,s
³
1− ζH
´
vy
¡
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H
s
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´θ(1+η)
Y Hs
Et
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(αHβ)s−t (1− τHs )uc
³
CHs , C
H
s
´³
PH,s
PH,t
´θ−1 ³
PH,s
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´
Y Hs
(13)
where pot (h) still applies at s, τ
H
s is a proportional tax rate on sales with the non-
zero steady-state level τH and ζH is an employment subsidy fully financed by
lump sum taxes that, removing average monopolistic and tax rate distortions,
ensures the eﬃciency of the steady-state output-level.4 The price index PH
evolves according to the law of motion
P 1−θH,t = α
HP 1−θH,t−1 +
¡
1− αH
¢
pot (h)
1−θ (14)
2.3 Policy Environment
To close the model presentation, description of the policy environment is in
order. In this section, we describe the instruments and constraints for the
monetary and fiscal policies and present a set of meaningful objective functions
facing the policy authorities. These policy functions have a twofold purpose:
(i) to enable the derivation of optimal discretionary policy rules across several
regimes of monetary and fiscal policies interactions and (ii) to assess the welfare
impacts of the diﬀerent policy regimes.
2.3.1 Policy instruments and constraints
In our model, the nominal interest rate, it, is the single instrument through
which the common monetary policy operates.
As for fiscal policy, we assume two alternative policy scenarios. In a first
set-up, lump-sum taxes
¡
TH
¢
are raised in suﬃcient amount to fully finance, in
each period, an employment subsidy
³
ζH
´
and the instruments used for stabi-
lization purposes — the home-biased government spending
¡
GH
¢
and the sales
tax rate
¡
τH
¢
.5 Here, fiscal policy is balanced-budget and Ricardian equivalence
holds. In a second scenario, lump-sum taxes only adjust to fully accommodate
the employment subsidy and the government inter-temporal solvency condition
appears as an additional binding constraint to the set of possible equilibrium
paths of the endogenous variables. In this case, the sources of strategic in-
teractions between monetary and the fiscal authorities are large, because both
policies impinge on debt sustainability. Stabilization fiscal policy instruments
4Following Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a, 2007b), we use this employment subsidy as a
device to eliminate linear terms in the social welfare function without loosing the possibility
of using the sales tax rates as fiscal policy instruments.
5For simplicity, we admit that government debt is zero in this scenario.
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are the same as in the first scenario, GH and τH and, thus, fiscal policy encom-
passes demand and supply-side eﬀects.6 The budget constraints for the fiscal
authorities can be written as:
BHt = (1+it−1)B
H
t−1 + PH,tG
H
t − τHt PH,tY Ht (15H)
BFt = (1+it−1)B
F
t−1 + PF,tG
F
t − τFt PF,tY Ft (15F)
where BHt and B
F
t represent the per capita nominal government debt of country
H and F, respectively.
With asset markets clearing only at the monetary union level, the sole public
sector inter-temporal budget constraint is the union-wide consolidated debt.
However, in the context of a monetary union with an institutional arrangement
like the EMU, there are arguments to impose the verification of this inter-
temporal budget constraint at the national levels. Accordingly,
bit = (1 + it)
µ
bit−1
Pt−1
Pt
+
Pi,t
Pt
Git − τ it
Pi,t
Pt
Y it
¶
, i = H,F (16)
where the variable bit ≡
(1+it)B
i
t
Pt
denotes the real value of debt at maturity in
per capita terms.
2.3.2 Equilibrium Conditions
To solve for the optimal policy, authorities have to take into account both the
private sector behaviour as well as the budget constraints, described above.
These conditions can be log-linearized and written in gap form as
Etcwt+1 = c
w
t + σ
¡
it −Etπwt+1
¢
(17)
yHt = scρ (1− n) qt + (1− sc) gHt + sccwt (18H)
yFt = −scρnqt + (1− sc) gFt + sccwt (18F)
πHt = βEtπ
H
t+1+k
H (1+scρη) (1-n) qt+kH
1+scση
σ
cwt +k
H (1-sc) ηgHt +k
H τ
H¡
1-τH
¢τHt
(19H)
πFt = βEtπ
F
t+1-k
F (1+scρη)nqt+kF
1+scση
σ
cwt +k
F (1-sc) ηgFt +k
F τ
F¡
1-τF
¢τFt
(19F)
6While it is consensual to treat the interest rate as the monetary policy instrument, it is
recognized that fiscal policy has many dimensions and that the several fiscal policy instruments
have diﬀerent eﬀects. Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005) and Gali and Monacelli (2007) assume
that the fiscal policy instrument is public spending financed by lump sum taxes, Ferrero
(2007) presents a model where fiscal policy is conducted through distortionary taxation and
public debt and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007b) consider three potential fiscal instruments -
government spending, labour income taxes and revenue taxes.
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qt = qt−1 + π
F
t − πHt −
³eTt − eTt−1´ (20)
bbHt = it+ 1β
½bbHt−1-πt+ (1-n) (1-β) qt+ Y
b
H
£
(1-sc) gHt -τ
HyHt -τ
HτHt
¤¾
+bεbH ,t
(21H)
bbFt = it+ 1β
½bbFt−1-πt-n (1-β) qt+ Y
b
F
£
(1-sc) gFt -τ
F yFt -τ
F τFt
¤¾
+bεbF ,t (21F)
where
kH≡
¡
1− αH
¢ ¡
1− αHβ
¢
αH (1 + θη)
; kF≡
¡
1− αF
¢ ¡
1− αFβ
¢
αF (1 + θη)
,
bεbH ,t and bεbF ,t are composite shocks defined as
bεbH ,t = eit+ 1β
½
(1-n) (1-β) eTt+Y
b
h
(1-sc) eGHt -τH eY Ht + ¡1-τH¢ bµHw,ti¾
bεbF ,t = eit+ 1β
½
−n (1-β) eTt+Y
b
h
(1-sc) eGFt -τF eY Ft + ¡1-τF ¢ bµFw,ti¾
and where lower case variables refer to variables in gaps. For a generic vari-
able, Xt, its gap is defined as xt = bXt − eXt, where bXt and eXt denote, respec-
tively, their eﬀective and eﬃcient flexible-price values, in log-deviations from the
zero-inflation eﬃcient steady-state (see, section 2.3.3, below). A "union-wide"
variable, Xw, is defined as Xw ≡ nXH + (1− n)XF .
Equation (17) refers to the IS equation, written in terms of the union con-
sumption7 and nominal interest-rate gaps. Equations (18H) and (18F) are
country-specific aggregate demand equations, with sc being the steady-state
consumption share of output and qt being the terms-of-trade gap (≡ bTt − eTt).
These three equations constitute the aggregate demand-side block of the model
and were derived from log-linearization of equations (7H), (7F), (8), (9) and
(10).
The aggregate supply-side block of the model was obtained from the log-
linear approximation of equations (13) and (14), as well as from their Foreign
counterparts, around the eﬃcient steady-state equilibrium. Equations (19H)
and (19F) are open-economy Phillips curves, describing the pure New-Keynesian
aggregate supply (AS) in each country. Positive gaps on the terms-of-trade, con-
sumption and public spending have inflationary consequences at H: an increase
in the demand for H-produced goods leads to more work eﬀort, and, thus,
raises marginal costs. Moreover, the positive gaps on the terms-of-trade and
on the consumption exert an additional inflationary pressure as they reduce the
marginal utility of nominal income for households. The eﬃcient tax rate eτ it,
7Assuming that the initial state-contingent securities distribution is such that the life-
time budget constraints of all households are identical, the risk-sharing condition implies that
cwt = cHt = cFt .
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used to compute the tax rate gap (τ it = bτ it − eτ it) in country i, is defined as the
tax rate required to fully oﬀset the impact of an idiosyncratic "cost-push" (wage
markup) shock.8 Equation (20) is the terms-of-trade gap’s identity, reflecting
the inflation diﬀerential and the one-period change in the eﬃcient level of the
terms-of-trade (eTt − eTt−1).
The final equations, (21H) and (21F), are the government budget constraints
relevant for the equilibrium allocation only in the second fiscal policy scenario.9
In sum, in the first balanced-budget policy scenario, given the path for policy
instruments and the initial value of bTt−1, the system including equations (17)-
(20) provides solutions for the endogenous variables cwt , y
H
t , y
F
t , π
H
t , π
F
t and
qt. In the second policy scenario, where policymakers are constrained to ensure
debt sustainability, equations (21H) and (21F) add to the previous system to
describe the economic structure of the economy.
2.3.3 Policy Objectives - The Social Planner’s Problem
The optimal allocation for the monetary union as a whole, in any given period
t, can be described as the solution to the following social planner’s problem,
where the single policy authority is willing to maximize the discounted sum of
the utility flows of the households belonging to the whole union (W ):
max
CHH,t, C
F
H,t, C
H
F,t,
CFF,t,G
H
t , G
F
t
W = E0
( ∞X
t=0
βt[nwHt + (1− n)wFt ]
)
, (22)
with wHt = u
³
CHt , C
H
t
´
+ V
¡
GHt
¢
− 1
n
Z n
0
v
³
Ljt
´
dj
and wFt = u
³
CFt , C
F
t
´
+ V
¡
GFt
¢
− 1
1− n
Z 1
n
v
³
Ljt
´
dj
s.t.
(production functions) Y Ht = a
H
t L
H
t
Y Ft = a
F
t L
F
t
(resource constraints) nY Ht = nC
H
H,t + (1− n)CFH,t + nGHt
(1− n)Y Ft = nCHF,t + (1− n)CFF,t + (1− n)GFt
(consumption indexes) CHt ≡
·
n
1
ρ
¡
CHH,t
¢ ρ−1
ρ + (1− n)
1
ρ
¡
CHF,t
¢ ρ−1
ρ
¸ ρ
ρ−1
CFt ≡
·
n
1
ρ
¡
CFH,t
¢ ρ−1
ρ + (1− n)
1
ρ
¡
CFF,t
¢ ρ−1
ρ
¸ ρ
ρ−1
8The steady-state tax rates are given by τ i = (1− β) b
i
Y + (1− sc) and the eﬃcient tax
rates by eτ it = − 1−τiτi bµiw,t, for i = H,F.
9The derivations of all these equations are available upon request.
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The social planner will choose to produce equal quantities of the diﬀerent
goods in each country. Moreover, the aggregation over all agents (households,
governments and central bank) cancels out the budget constraints and, thus,
the social planner’s solution is not constrained by them.
Maximization program in (22) yields the following optimallity conditions
uc
³
CHt , C
H
t
´
n
1
ρ
Ã
CHH,t
CHt
!− 1ρ
= vy
¡
Y Ht ; a
H
t
¢
(23)
uc
³
CHt , C
H
t
´
(1− n)
1
ρ
Ã
CHF,t
CHt
!− 1ρ
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¡
Y Ft ; a
F
t
¢
(24)
uc
³
CFt , C
F
t
´
n
1
ρ
Ã
CFH,t
CFt
!− 1ρ
= vy
¡
Y Ht ; a
H
t
¢
(25)
uc
³
CFt , C
F
t
´
(1− n)
1
ρ
Ã
CFF,t
CFt
!− 1ρ
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¡
Y Ft ; a
F
t
¢
(26)
VG
¡
GHt
¢
= vy
¡
Y Ht , a
H
t
¢
(27)
VG
¡
GFt
¢
= vy
¡
Y Ft , a
F
t
¢
(28)
Eﬃcient equilibrium In a symmetric eﬃcient steady-state equilibrium, it
follows that Y
H
= Y
F
= Y ; CH = CF = C; CHH = C
F
H = nC; C
H
F = C
F
F =
(1− n)C and GH = GF = G.
The complete solution for the eﬃcient equilibrium is given by the following
expressions (29-32)
eCwt = 11 + η [scσ + (1− sc)ψ]
n
[1 + (1− sc)ψη] bCwt + (1 + η)σbawt o (29)
eCHH,t − eCHF,t = eCFH,t − eCFF,t = − ρ (1 + η)1 + η [scρ+ (1− sc)ψ] ¡baFt − baHt ¢ (30)
eGwt = ψ1 + η [scσ + (1− sc)ψ]
h
−ηscbCwt + (1 + η)bawt i (31)
eGFt − eGHt = (1 + η)ψ1 + η [scρ+ (1− sc)ψ] ¡baFt − baHt ¢ (32)
To fully define the gap variables described in section above, we need to deter-
mine the eﬃcient interest rate and terms-of-trade levels. The former follows
directly from the Euler equation, while the latter results from the combination
of equation (30) with the optimal intratemporal household’s allocations
eit = 1σEt h³ eCwt+1 − eCwt ´− ³bCwt+1 − bCwt ´i (33)
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eTt = − 1 + η
1 + η [scρ+ (1− sc)ψ]
¡baFt − baHt ¢ . (34)
In the first fiscal policy scenario (lump-sum taxes warrant balanced budgets)
this eﬃcient allocation corresponds to the decentralized flexible-price equilib-
rium when monopolistic and tax distortions are removed through an employ-
ment subsidy and the implemented government spending rules agree with those
derived under the social planner’s optimization. However, in the second fiscal
policy scenario, that union-wide optimal allocation may not be supported as a
flexible-price equilibrium, since fiscal policy instruments may have to deviate
from those rules to ensure fiscal solvency. Anyway, the policy problem will be
formulated with variables in gaps defined in terms of the eﬃcient outcomes and
the two steady-state equilibriums coincide.
Steady-state equilibrium In order to avoid the traditional inflationary bias
problem arising from an ineﬃciently low steady-state output level, we will as-
sume the existence of an employment subsidy that removes average monopolis-
tic and tax rate distortions. To compute this employment subsidy, observe that
the profit-maximizing H-firms, in a flexible-price setup, choose the same price
pt (h) = PH,t such that
uc
³
CHt , C
H
t
´
=
θ
(θ − 1)
¡
1− τHt
¢µHw,t ³1− ζH´ hn+ (1− n)T 1−ρt i 11−ρ vy ¡Y Ht , aHt ¢
and, the Foreign counterpart of this price-setting behaviour is given by
uc
³
CFt , C
F
t
´
=
θ
(θ − 1)
¡
1− τFt
¢µFw,t ³1− ζF´hnT ρ−1t + (1− n)i 11−ρ vy ¡Y Ft ; aFt ¢
To get symmetry in the steady-state levels of the output, consumption,
government spending and prices in both countries, we need to impose that
θ
(θ−1)(1−τH)
µw
³
1− ζH
´
= θ
(θ−1)(1−τF )
µw
³
1− ζF
´
= µ where, as we have
already remarked, the employment subsidy ζi is fully financed by lump sum
taxes.10
In steady-state, we verify that
uc
¡
C,C
¢
= µvy
¡
Y , a
¢
and, if the employment subsidy ζi is set to match µ = 1, the eﬃcient steady-
state output-level holds. Hence, the employment subsidy in country i = H,F
is assumed to take the value
ζi = 1−
(θ − 1)
¡
1− τ i
¢
θµw
(35)
The steady-state nominal (and real) interest rate is i = 1/β − 1.
10Following Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a, 2007b), we use this employment subsidy as a
device to eliminate linear terms in the social welfare function without losing the possibility
of using the sales tax rates as fiscal policy instruments. This employment subsidy is financed
using lump-sum taxes.
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2.3.4 Policy Objectives - The Social Loss Function
Benevolent authorities seek to maximize the social (whole union) loss function,
W , given, now, the set of equations describing the eﬀective economic structure
dynamics: (17)-(20), in the first policy scenario; and (17)-(21F), in the second
policy scenario. Moreover, full cooperation between monetary and fiscal author-
ities characterizes the policy regime. This environment enables the derivation
of union-wide optimal stabilization policies, but serves also as a benchmark to
assess alternative policy regimes.
Following Rotemberg andWoodford (1998, 1999), Woodford (2003), Benigno
(2004), Amato and Laubach (2003), Steinsson (2003) and Beetsma and Jensen
(2004, 2005), we compute a quadratic (second-order Taylor series) approxima-
tion of W around a deterministic steady-state. Ignoring the terms independent
of policy as well as terms of, the approximation yields:11
W ' −ΩE0
( ∞X
t=0
βtLt
)
, (36)
where
Lt = Λc (cwt )
2+Λg
h
n
¡
gHt
¢2
+ (1-n)
¡
gFt
¢2i
+Λgc (cwt )
£
n
¡
gHt
¢
+ (1-n)
¡
gFt
¢¤
+ΛT q2t − ΛgT
¡
gFt -g
H
t
¢
qt+nΛHπ
¡
πHt
¢2
+ (1-n)ΛFπ
¡
πFt
¢2
(37)
and
Λc ≡ sc
µ
1
σ
+scη
¶
, Λg ≡ (1-sc)
µ
1
ψ
+(1-sc)η
¶
, Λgc ≡ 2sc (1-sc) η,
ΛT ≡ n (1-n) scρ (1+scρη) , ΛgT ≡ 2n (1-n) sc (1-sc) ρη,
ΛHπ ≡
θ (1+θη)αH
(1-αHβ) (1-αH)
, ΛFπ ≡
θ (1+θη)αF
(1-αFβ) (1-αF )
Fluctuations in the consumption and the public spending gaps imply welfare
losses (in line with households’, respective, risk aversion, 1/σ and 1/ψ), as well
as fluctuations in work eﬀort (η). Inflation at H is more costly the higher the
degree of nominal rigidity
¡
αH
¢
, the higher the elasticity of substitution between
H-produced goods (θ) and the higher the elasticity of disutility with respect to
work eﬀort (η). The welfare cost of inflation vanishes
¡
ΛHπ
¢
when prices are
fully flexible
¡
αH = 0
¢
.
At the monetary union level, misallocation of goods also applies for devi-
ations of the terms-of-trade from the respective eﬃcient level. The costs of
this distortion (ΛT ) increase with the elasticity of substitution between Home
and Foreign produced goods (ρ) , with the steady-state consumption share on
output (sc) , with η and decrease with country-size asymmetry. Following an
11The derivation of the social loss function is available upon request.
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asymmetric technology shock, eﬃciency requires prices to change as to shift
the adjustment burden ”equally” across the two countries (Benigno and López-
Salido, 2006). This creates a trade-oﬀ for the monetary authority between the
stabilization of relative prices to the correspondent eﬃcient levels and the sta-
bilization of inflation in both countries and, thus, provides a rational for the
stabilization role of fiscal policy.
The cross-term between the consumption gap and the weighted average gov-
ernment spending gap occurs because positive co-movements between these two
variables cause undesirable fluctuations in the work eﬀort for the monetary union
as a whole, in addition to the eﬀort fluctuations caused by each of these vari-
ables per se. There is also a negative cross-term between the terms of trade gap
and the relative spending gap that is increasing (in absolute value) with η and
ρ, while decreasing with country-size asymmetry. This negative co-movement
arises because a positive terms-of-trade gap rises H-competitiveness which, com-
bined with a negative relative public spending gap (higher public spending at H
than at F), shifts demand towards H-produced goods. As a consequence, work
eﬀort shifts from F- towards H- households (cf. Beetsma and Jensen 2004 and
2005, for these arguments).
2.3.5 Other policy objectives
We also consider that policymakers may have divergent policy objectives. This
is a valid assumption since it is reasonable to conjecture that national (fiscal)
authorities are mainly concerned with their own citizens and so, their objective
functions should only comprise the utility of the respective constituencies. Prag-
matically, we approximate the national welfare criteria through welfare losses
obtained from splitting the union-wide loss function. We let for future work the
proper derivation of the national welfare functions.12
We will also consider the case of the delegation of monetary policy to a
weight-conservative central bank by distorting the weights on the inflation and
the output terms of the social loss function. Delegating monetary policy to a
weight-conservative central bank is usually seen as a potential solution to reduce
the time-inconsistency problems of policy stabilization, which can be aggravated
by specific incentives of the fiscal authorities.
The table below summarizes the policy environments we will analyze.
12The derivation of the appropriate utility-based loss functions for independent and non-
cooperative fiscal authorities requires extra computations to avoid linear terms. Benigno and
Benigno (2006) obtain loss functions, for cooperative and non-cooperative monetary policy
regimes, that are formally identical to ours but diﬀerent regarding the targets and the relative
weights.
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Benevolent Cooperative Policymakers
LH,Ft =Lt
LMt =Lt
Benevolent non-Cooperative Policymakers
LHt =Λc (c
w
t )
2
+Λg
¡
gHt
¢2
+Λgccwt g
H
t +ΛT q
2
t +
1
nΛgT g
H
t qt+Λ
H
π
¡
πHt
¢2
LFt =Λc (c
w
t )
2
+Λg
¡
gFt
¢2
+Λgccwt g
F
t +ΛT q
2
t − 11−nΛgT gFt qt+ΛFπ
¡
πFt
¢2
LMt =Lt
Conservative Central Bank
LHt ;L
F
t
LMt =(1-ρ
c)
n
Λc (cwt )
2
+Λg
h
n
¡
gHt
¢2
+ (1-n)
¡
gFt
¢2i
+Λgccwt
£
n
¡
gHt
¢
+ (1-n)
¡
gFt
¢¤
+
+ΛT q
2
t -ΛgT
¡
gFt -g
H
t
¢
qt
o
+ρc
n
nΛHπ
¡
πHt
¢2
+ (1-n)ΛFπ
¡
πFt
¢2o
2.4 Policy Games
We assume that fiscal and monetary authorities set their policy instruments in
order to minimize the respective loss functions, given the dynamic structure of
the economies, and that they can engage themselves in various policy games.
We will consider, as a benchmark case for policy analysis, that policymakers
are benevolent and cooperate under discretion. To assess the importance of the
time-consistency, we also compute the optimal policy solution under commit-
ment. These two optimizing problems will be solved by using the algorithms in
Soderlind (1999).
We also consider discretionary non-cooperative policy games and, depending
on the time of events, we can obtain Nash or leadership equilibria. In these
diﬀerent setups, the timing of the events is as following: 1) the private sector
forms expectations; 2) the shocks are realized; 3a) the central bank sets the
interest rate; 3b) the fiscal authorities choose the right amount of fiscal policy
instruments. If 3a) and 3b) occur simultaneously we get a Nash equilibrium; if
3a) occurs before the central bank chooses its policy and the latter is aware of
the fiscal policy reaction, we get a monetary leadership equilibrium; if the order
of the occurrences is reversed, we have fiscal leadership equilibria. We will also
assume that the fiscal authorities act at the same time, playing Nash. To solve
for these dynamic policy games we use the methodology developed by Blake and
Kirsanova (2006) for a closed-economy setup and by Kirsanova et al. (2005) for
an open-economy model.
To illustrate the methodology involved, we next present the case of a full
non-cooperative discretionary game with monetary leadership.13
We have five strategic agents in the game. There are three explicit players,
the monetary and the two fiscal authorities, and two implicit players, the private
13Also as an example, we present, in the appendix, a numerical algorithm for the solution
of this regime.
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sector of both countries. In this type of game, the monetary authority moves first
and sets the interest rate. Then, the two fiscal authorities decide the amount
of their policy instruments. Finally, the last players are the private sectors of
both countries.
To solve for this type of game, inversion of the order of playing is required:
we start by solving the optimization for the last player ending up with the
optimization for the leader (first player). The private sector’s optimization
problem is already solved out - the system of the structural equations of the
model - and can be represented by the system:
·
Yt+1
Xt+1
¸
=
·
A11 A12
A21 A22
¸ ·
Yt
Xt
¸
+
·
B11 B12
B21 B22
¸ ·
UHt
UFt
¸
+
·
D1
D2
¸
UMt +
·
εt+1
O
¸
(38)
where Yt are predetermined state variables and Xt are the eﬀective instruments
of private sectors, the non-predetermined or jump variables (consumption and
the two inflation rates, in our model). The policy instruments are represented
by UHt , U
F
t and U
M
t . U
H
t and U
F
t stand for the instruments of the followers
which are, respectively, the Home and the Foreign fiscal authorities, while UMt
represents the instrument of the leader, which is the monetary authority. εt+1
is a vector of innovations to Yt with covariance matrix Σ. This system describes
the evolution of the economy as observed by policymakers.
In the discretionary case, the three policymakers reoptimize every period by
taking the process by which private agents form their expectations as given - and
where the expectations are consistent with actual policies (Söderlind 1999). The
two Nash fiscal authorities minimize their loss functions treating the monetary
policy instrument as parametric but incorporating the reaction functions of the
private sectors. Assuming that the fiscal authority of the H country has the
following objective function:
1
2
E0
∞X
t=0
βt
³
GH
0
t Q
HGHt
´
=
1
2
E0
∞X
t=0
βt
¡
Z 0tQHZt + Z 0tPHUt + U 0tPH0Zt + U 0tRHUt
¢
(39)
where GHt is the target variables for the H fiscal authority while Q
H is the
corresponding matrix of weights. The target variables can be rewritten in terms
of the predetermined and non-predetermined state variables collected on vector
Zt, in terms of the policy instruments (Ut) and in terms of combinations of
these two variables. Being a follower, the H fiscal authority observes monetary
authority’s actions and reacts to them. In a linear-quadratic setup, the optimal
solution belongs to the class of linear feedback rules of the form:
UHt = −FHYt − LHUMt (40)
where FH denotes feedback coeﬃcients on the predetermined state variables
and LH is the leadership parameter. The other fiscal authority solves a similar
problem and get:
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UFt = −FFYt − LFUMt (41)
Being in a Nash game, the two fiscal authorities do not respond to each
other’s actions.
The monetary leadership authority takes into account these fiscal policy
reaction functions as well as the private sector’s optimal conditions, when solves
its optimization problem. Thus, the leader can manipulate the follower by
changing its policy instrument. The monetary leadership reaction function takes
the form of:
UMt = −FMYt (42)
2.5 Calibration
Our baseline calibration was chosen taking as reference Beetsma and Jensen
(2004, 2005), Benigno and Benigno (2006), Benigno (2004), Benigno and López-
Salido (2006) and Ferrero (2007).
As it is common in the literature, we assume that each period corresponds
to a one quarter of a year. The one period discount factor of the private sector
and policy makers β is set to 0.99, which implies a four percent annual basis
steady-state interest rate.
The parameter θ, the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in
the same country, is set such that the price mark-up is equal to 10%. We thus set
θ equal to 11, which is a high value than the one found in the literature where
distortions come only from monopolistic competition in the goods market14 .
The elasticity of substitution between Home and the Foreign produced goods
ρ is set to 4.5, as in Benigno and Benigno (2006). These authors remark that,
when this intratemporal elasticity is higher than the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in consumption (σ) , the home and the foreign goods are substitutes
in the utility. We follow Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005) and set the coeﬃcient
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption σ at 0.4, which
implies a coeﬃcient of risk aversion for private consumption equal to 2.5. This
is also the value we adopt for the coeﬃcient of risk aversion for public spending
(1/ψ = 2.5). The steady-state value of consumption over output
¡
sc = C/Y
¢
is
set at 0.75 in our baseline calibration.
Following Benigno and Benigno (2006) and Ferrero (2007), the inverse of the
Frisch elasticity of labour supply to real wage, η, is assumed to be 0.47.15 Our
benchmark calibration intends to reflect a perfectly symmetric setup from which
we can diverge and assess how asymmetries aﬀect the results. Hence, we begin
by assuming that the two economies in the monetary union have an equal size
(n = 0.5), have identical degrees of nominal rigidities
¡
αH = αF
¢
. We select a
14See Ferrero (2007) on this.
15Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005) emphasize the dilemma of choosing reasonable values for
this parameter and for the mark-up and getting realistic magnitudes on the inflation response
to changes in real variables. They set η = 0.3 and η = 10 on their papers of 2005 and 2004,
respectively.
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value for α equal to 0.75, in order to get an average length of price contracts equal
to one year. To match the numerical constraint of the Maastricht Treaty, the
yearly steady-state debt-output ratio is calibrated to 60%, in the second policy
scenario where budgetary constraints are binding.16 However, we also explore
the implications of alternative assumptions regarding the relative dimensions of
the two countries and the initial steady-state debt stock.17
Finally, we assume that the consumption and the technology shocks follow
an uncorrelated AR(1) process with common persistence of 0.85, while the wage
mark-up shocks are i.i.d., and the standard deviation of the innovations are equal
to 0.01.
In what follows, we will broadly assume that policymakers engage in optimiz-
ing discretionary fiscal and monetary policy games. We attempt to draw welfare
implications arising from diﬀerent policy regimes under the two fiscal policy sce-
narios - with and without debt constraints. In particular, special attention will
be given to the analysis across several degrees of country size asymmetry (from
nH = 0.5, for a symmetric monetary union, to nH = 0.9) and across meaningful
debt levels (yearly debt-to-output ratios from 50% to 100%).
2.6 Discretionary policy outcomes under cooperation
Strategic interactions among fiscal and monetary authorities in a monetary
union are absent when they agree to maximize the union-wide social welfare.
However, if policymakers cannot commit relative to the private sector, there can
be meaningful strategic interactions between the former and the latter leading
to substantial discrepancy between discretionary and commitment cooperative
policy outcomes. Within our fiscal policy scenarios, time-inconsistency prob-
lems only reveal to be significant and critical to understand the discretionary
outcomes, when stabilization policies face debt constraints.
In eﬀect, in the balanced-budget scenario, the solutions under discretion
and commitment coincide. Moreover, within this scenario, only asymmetric
technology shocks impose welfare costs and require fiscal policy instruments
deviating from their eﬃcient levels.18 Hence, monetary policy does not face
stabilization trade-oﬀs. Furthermore, given that the marginal costs and the
inflation rates of the smaller (and more open economies) are aﬀected, to a larger
extent, by changes in the relative prices, small countries have to perform more
active fiscal policies19 than the larger ones and, even so, face worse stabilization
performance.
16We calibrate debt to be zero, in the balanced-budget policy scenario.
17Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a) have shown that the optimal discretionary stabilization
policy plan depends crucially on the level of the debt-output ratio. The relative eﬃciency
of the monetary and fiscal policy instruments to accomplish the short-run and the long-run
stabilization assignments depends on the size of the debt stock: the tax rate reveals to increase
its short-run stabilization performance with the raise of the debt-output ratio at the same time
as it becomes less eﬀective on the satisfaction of the government budget constraint.
18From Tables 1 and 2 it is clear that the feedback coeﬃcients on symmetric shocks and
on mark-up shocks of the fiscal and monetary policy rules are zero and that only fiscal policy
feeds back on asymmetric technology shocks.
19We will consider that a policy is more active if it increases, in absolute value, the deviation
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Figure 1 details the responses of key endogenous variables to a 1% negative
technology shock hitting the large country (H) which, in the balanced-budget
fiscal policy scenario, is equivalent to a positive technology shock hitting the
small one (F). It is apparent that this shock, with a direct positive eﬀect on
the terms-of-trade gap and ineﬃciently shifting demand from F to H, justifies
a large increase in the government spending gap and in the tax rate gap of the
small country to lessen the asymmetric eﬀect of the shock. Notwithstanding, we
can also observe that this is not enough to avoid the higher (relative to the large
country) variability of its inflation and output gap, under optimal discretionary
or committed cooperative policies.
A shock, such as a negative symmetric technology shock that could be fully
stabilized, under a balanced-budget policy scenario, leads to policy trade-oﬀs
and welfare stabilization costs, when policy instruments have to be adjusted to
ensure fiscal solvency. The structure of discounting embedded in the welfare
criterion, determining that smaller but more permanent gaps on welfare-related
variables deliver lower welfare costs than larger, although transitory, gaps, de-
termines that it would be optimal to let debt accommodate the shocks and to
adjust fiscal policy instruments just to sustain the new (higher) debt stock lev-
els. As a result, there would be long-lasting (negative) gaps on consumption,
government spending and output. However, in the first period, once forward-
looking expectations have been formed, policymakers may face the incentive to
adopt policies that reduce those permanent eﬀects because their consequences
for short-run macroeconomic volatility could be slighter. Actually, as Leith and
Wren-Lewis (2007a) have demonstrated, this conduces to a first-period policy,
under commitment, that guarantees smaller permanent eﬀects on the debt-to-
output ratios, relative to a policy that could not benefit of the existence of
predetermined expectations. The temptation to adopt the same policy they
implemented at the first-period, if policymakers could re-optimise thereafter -
that characterizes the time-inconsistency problem of the optimal policy under
commitment -, will only disappear when permanent disequilibria are fully elim-
inated and the debt-to-output ratios return to their pre-shock levels. Hence,
government debt is a source of considerable time-consistency problems which
reveal decisive to explain discretionary policy outcomes and their large discrep-
ancy relative to the ones obtained under commitment. Eﬀectively, we observe
that, in accordance with the findings of Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a, 2007b),
under the optimal discretionary stabilization policy plan, all variables return to
their eﬃcient pre-shock levels at expenses of higher short-run volatility, whereas
an optimal commitment policy plan would give rise to a more permanent dise-
quilibrium in the debt-output ratios and in some welfare-related variables but
lower short-run variability (see Figure 2). Here, the aggressive policy response
to shocks, in order to control future expectations and improve stabilization of
current variables, manifests in small but inertial deviations of the policy in-
struments from their eﬃcient values and permanent variations of government
debts.
of the policy instruments from their eﬃcient values.
19
Additionally, since the level of government indebtedness aﬀects the relative
eﬀectiveness of the fiscal and monetary policy instruments on debt stabiliza-
tion, the elimination of the long-term debt consequences is achieved diversely
in small and large public debt scenarios, under discretion. In fact, the larger
the steady-state debt-output ratios, the larger the impact of monetary policy in
debt-service costs and,thus, the incentive to shift monetary policy conducting
towards debt stabilization increases with the level of the latter; conversely, fiscal
policy instruments — particularly, the tax rate gaps — lose eﬃcacy to control debt
and become relatively more apt to oﬀset the inflationary consequences. For the
considered (large) steady-state levels of public debt, the optimal discretionary
policy entails a first-period cut in the interest rate gap in response to a sym-
metric shock that raises simultaneously debt and inflation, in a discretionary
full cooperative policy regime.20 This response is complemented, initially, with
a decrease of the government spending gaps while, depending on the magnitude
of the large debt-output ratios, the tax rate gaps may increase, to help debt sta-
bilization, or may decrease to oﬀset inflationary consequences.21 The resulting
decline of the debt induces policymakers to move policy instruments in opposite
direction in the subsequent period (see the adjustments to a negative technology
symmetric shock, b = 60% vs. b = 80%, in Figure 3).
Thus, the presence of government debt and the need to ensure fiscal solvency
lead to time-consistency problems that materialize in a bias towards debt stabi-
lization and a worse short-run macroeconomic stabilization performance, when
policy is conducted in a period-by-period optimizing way. In contrast with the
balanced-budget policy scenario, the welfare consequences of symmetric and id-
iosyncratic mark-up shocks can no longer be fully eliminated, as it is apparent
from inspection of the policy feedback coeﬃcients on these shocks (see Tables 1-
4). Likewise, the time-consistent policy response to a negative technology shock
at H, requiring, in the first period, an increase of the tax rate gap at H and a
fall in the interest rate gap and in the tax rate gap at F, magnifies the eﬀects on
the inflation rates and on the consumption gap. This is evident from compari-
son of Figures 4 and 1 which illustrate the case of a negative technology shock
hitting a large country (H) under cooperation in the two fiscal policy scenarios.
The diﬀerence for a country-size symmetric monetary union is on the relatively
larger short-run fluctuation experienced by the small country.
As expected, these adjustments influence the computations of the social loss
under the two policy scenarios. In eﬀect, by examination of Tables 5-6, it
is easy to check that, under full cooperation, the welfare costs of the shocks
are large when policy stabilization can not benefit from the existence of non-
distortionary government sources of financing. These costs diminish with the
degree of country-size asymmetry22 and the representative household of the large
20For suﬃciently small levels of public debt, the interest rate gap could augment in response
to a shock that raises debt and boosts inflation.
21Under our model calibration, a negative symmetric technology shock requires a decrease
on the tax rate gaps for steady-state debt-output ratios larger or equal to 65%.
22 In practice, large country-size asymmetry implies a more symmetric structure of shocks
at the union level.
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country is clearly better-oﬀ, relative to the one living in the small country. This
asymmetric distribution of the stabilization burden between the large and the
small country amplifies with the level of government indebtedness: the monetary
union and its large country profit with the raise of the debt-to-output ratios,
while the small country loses.
2.7 Discretionary policy outcomes under non-cooperative
regimes
The non-cooperative set up introduces the possibility of strategic interactions
between the policymakers. Diﬀerences in the policy objectives, in the order of
playing - Nash, monetary leadership or fiscal leadership - and in the relative size
of each country may shape such strategic interactions.
Balanced-budget policies In face of an asymmetric technology shock, the
tax rate and the government spending responses alleviate the impact on do-
mestic inflation rates but accentuate the eﬀect of this type of shock on the
terms-of-trade gap. The latter produces a negative externality which, if not
fully internalized by national authorities, implies a more active use of fiscal
policy instruments.
With equal-size countries, this free-riding behaviour between fiscal author-
ities does not aggravate a potential free-riding problem between them and the
central bank because the eﬀects of their (symmetric) actions on union-wide
variables cancel out. When it leads, the central bank anticipates this outcome
and, thus, the monetary leadership and the Nash solutions coincide. On the
other hand, under fiscal leadership, each fiscal authority ignores that the other
government will set a symmetric policy, but it perceives that the central bank,
internalizing the negative fiscal policy externalities, will react to an excessive
policy response. As a consequence, both governments moderate their fiscal pol-
icy responses, reducing the free-riding problem (Cf. the fiscal policy feedback
coeﬃcients on aH in Table 1). Therefore, among the non-cooperative regimes,
the fiscal leadership delivers the lowest welfare stabilization costs.
Conversely, in a monetary union with country-size asymmetry, small coun-
tries suﬀer to a greater extent the impact of country-specific shocks and cause
smaller cross-border eﬀects; thus, their incentives may diﬀer from those experi-
enced by fiscal authorities of the large countries. The smaller a country is, the
smaller are its externalities and the larger are the incentives of its government to
free-ride; the large country, imposing larger spill over eﬀects, will be more cau-
tious in using its fiscal policy. This asymmetric conduct impinges on union-wide
variables and forces a reaction of monetary policy to idiosyncratic technology
shocks. From inspection of Table 2, one can see the extra fiscal policy activism
of the small country (F) under Nash compared with the cooperative solution,
as well as the diﬀerent fiscal policy conducting of the large country. Being rel-
atively more active, the fiscal policy of the small country determines the eﬀect
on aggregate fiscal policy instruments. Hence, since government spending gap
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and the tax rate gap increase at F in response to a negative technology shock at
H, the interest rate gap increases to alleviate inflationary consequences at the
union-wide level (see Figure 1, for a comparison of the dynamics under coop-
eration and Nash). Non-cooperation clearly benefits the small country, since it
can achieve a better stabilization of its inflation rate making use of a costless
policy instrument - the tax rate gap -, at the expenses of the large country.
With country-size asymmetry, and relative to Nash, fiscal leadership fur-
ther exacerbates the "indiscipline" of the country that has more incentives to
free-ride - the small country - while moderating the large country’s fiscal policy
reaction; the large country perceives that its policy largely impacts on aggregate
variables to which the central bank reacts. Under monetary leadership, the cen-
tral bank, perceiving the opposite incentives of the fiscal authorities, counteracts
the aggregate eﬀects of the small country’s fiscal policy. This moderates fiscal
policy at F but it leads to a more active fiscal policy at H. The welfare ranking
of the two policy regimes depends on the degree of country-size asymmetry and
on the balance of the diﬀerent incentives. For strong country-size asymmetry
(nH ≥ 0.85) there are welfare gains from having a monetary leadership that
extend to all countries.
Table 5 shows that policy cooperation dominates non-cooperation for the
monetary union, independently of its degree of country-size asymmetry, but
cooperation reveals to be worse for the small country. In general, the latter
prefers the fiscal leadership regime, except if it is too small. The preferences
of the large country are in accordance with those for the monetary union as
a whole. It benefits from being in a full cooperative regime and, among the
non-cooperative regimes, it profits when it leads relative to the central bank, as
long as the degree of country-size asymmetry is not too high.
Binding government budget constraints In this scenario, the need to
ensure fiscal solvency amplifies the sources of strategic interactions between
monetary and fiscal policies.
In an equal-sized monetary union, the incentives each fiscal authority face
are similar: 1) they use more (less) actively the fiscal policy instruments that
cause negative (positive) cross-border eﬀects; 2) they free-ride on monetary pol-
icy to accommodate debt and, thus, react less to debt-disequilibria. Relative
to the cooperative policy, and in face of a negative technology shock at H, this
materializes in a smaller variation of the tax rate gaps and in a larger response
of the government spending and of the interest rate gaps. Comparative to Nash
equilibrium, where policymakers act simultaneously, fiscal leadership accentu-
ates the free-riding of fiscal policy relative to monetary policy whereas monetary
leadership controls it better. For instance, in face of a negative country-specific
technology shock, aggregate fiscal policy and monetary policy turn out to be
looser under fiscal leadership relative to the outcome under monetary leader-
ship.23
23This can be checked by computing, for the various policy regimes, the aggregate govern-
ment spending and tax rate responses to an idiosyncratic negative technologic shock at H,
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In fact, monetary policy becomes more debt-accommodative across all non-
cooperative regimes. Apparently, non-cooperation between domestically-oriented
fiscal authorities cannot mitigate the time-consistency problem of both mone-
tary and fiscal policies. By non-internalizing the cross-border fiscal policy eﬀects
and aggravating the time-consistency problem of the monetary policy, the non-
cooperative regimes inflict larger welfare stabilization costs than cooperation,
in spite of their positive eﬀect on the time-consistency problem of fiscal policy.
These welfare costs are attenuated under monetary leadership while magnified
under fiscal leadership. Consequently, monetary leadership displays the lowest
welfare costs among the non-cooperative policy games whilst fiscal leadership
delivers the worse stabilization outcome (see Table 6, for nH = 0.5).
Considering now country-size asymmetry, the incentives that each govern-
ment faces are the result of the type but also of the size of the externalities
it causes. As in the balanced-budget policy scenario, small countries, caus-
ing small externalities, have incentives to engage in more active fiscal policies
than under cooperation. However, as the additional activism of the fiscal pol-
icy response moves towards debt-stabilization, it has negative consequences for
the macroeconomic stabilization of the small countries. Conversely, the large
countries are more likely to implement relatively less active fiscal policies under
non-cooperation; a moderated fiscal policy response to shocks, i.e, less active-
ness on the control of the domestic budgetary consequences, leads to a better
macroeconomic stabilization performance. Hence, in practice, this reasoning
pairs with the argument that large countries, expecting domestic debt accom-
modation from the monetary policy, have less incentives to use fiscal policy in-
struments towards debt control and engage in fiscal policies that aim at achieving
a better domestic macroeconomic stabilization. Likewise, a small country, re-
lying to a less extent on the monetary policy accommodation of debt, becomes
more cautious towards the use of fiscal policy in order to control for its do-
mestic budgetary consequences and achieves a worse stabilization performance.
To mitigate these asymmetric welfare consequences, the union-wide benevolent
central bank accommodates relatively more the budgetary consequences of the
small country than it would do in a cooperative policy regime and takes con-
verse attitude relative to the large country (cf. feedback coeﬃcients on Table
4). In this policy context and in comparison with the Nash equilibrium, the
fiscal leadership scenario aggravates the free-riding problem between the large
country’s fiscal authority and the central bank, whilst the monetary leadership
moderates it.24
In fact, we find that for the small country and the monetary union as a whole,
enhancing policy cooperation is welfare-improving, unless there is a markedly
high degree of country-size asymmetry (see Table 6). Policy cooperation can be
using the feedback coeﬃcients on Table 3.
24From inspection of Table 4, we verify that, relative to Nash and in response to a negative
technology shock at H, the government spending gap falls less (more) and the tax rate gap
decreases by more (less) at H in fiscal leadership (monetary leadership). Hence, in fiscal
leadership (monetary leadership) the fiscal policy of the large country is globally more loose
(tight).
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counterproductive in a monetary union where monetary policy accommodates
proportionally the budgetary consequences of an excessively large country, in a
large-debt monetary union. Moreover, if fiscal policies focus on national interests
and do not cooperate, there are obvious social welfare stabilization gains from
having a benevolent central bank that moves first. However, the large country
— enhancing welfare under non-cooperation - prefers fiscal leadership, the policy
regime where it can exploit its larger strategic position vis-à-vis the central
bank. Hence, in a large-debt monetary union and for a suﬃciently high degree
of country-size asymmetry (nH ≥ 0.6), the policy regimes that deliver a better
stabilization performance for the union may hardly emerge, since indebted large
countries may strongly oppose to them.
Summing-up The outcomes of the discretionary policy games depend, cru-
cially, on the type of incentives that the existence or not of non-distortionary
sources of government financing creates. For the country that inflicts larger ex-
ternalities — the large country — the welfare rankings match those of the union-
wide, in the balanced-budget scenario. Conversely, when monetary policy moves
towards debt-accommodation, it is the small country that has coincident welfare
rankings with the union.
Under balanced-budget policies, monetary policy stabilization trade-oﬀs arise
only in presence of domestically oriented small country’s governments that, ben-
efiting from free-rider behaviours, perform more active fiscal policies. The policy
regime that performs a better stabilization performance for the monetary union
as a whole — policy cooperation — also dominates for the large countries. When
debt constraints apply, monetary policy accommodates budgetary consequences
in a large-debt monetary union and the free-riding incentives of the large coun-
tries dominate; so it may be hard to implement the socially desirable policy
regime. In this case, the fiscal leadership regime could be more likely to emerge.
Additionally, under non-cooperation, the union’s welfare decreases when the
steady-state debt-to-output ratios increase symmetrically across countries (see
Table 7). Moreover, this welfare reduction impacts exclusively in the small coun-
try, while the large country achieves a better stabilization outcome in higher-
debt scenarios. Hence, focusing exclusively on welfare consequences of the sta-
bilization policies, large countries are better-oﬀ in a large indebted monetary
union, under a fiscal leadership regime; if this outcome prevails, it will lead to
the worst stabilization performance for the union as a whole.25
2.8 The case for a conservative central bank
In the debt-constrained framework, the large country may oppose to the cooper-
ative solution, which, among the discretionary policy regimes, broadly delivers
the best union-wide welfare outcome. Additionally, fiscal leadership is the most
preferred regime for the large country. Since this non-cooperative regime is more
25The welfare losses for the yearly debt-to-output ratios from 50% to 100% are available
upon request.
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likely to emerge, we assess if the existence can improve on this outcome. Relying
in the existent literature, the welfare gains from this institutional arrangement
are uncontroversial in the context of monetary policy models (see, among others,
Rogoﬀ, 1985, and Clarida et al, 1999). However, in the context of models that
integrate monetary and fiscal policies, the presence of a conservative central
bank is not unambiguously positive (see, for instance, Dixit and Lambertini,
2001, 2003a, 2003b, Adam and Billi, 2006, and Blake and Kirsanova, 2006).
In the balanced-budget scenario, where cooperative solution under commit-
ment coincides with that under discretion, a weight-conservative central bank
may be seen as a device to attenuate distortions arising only from the lack of pol-
icy cooperation. The eventual welfare gains of implementing this institutional
policy arrangement in this policy scenario are just marginal. In fact, these gains
proved to be null under monetary leadership. Under fiscal leadership, monetary
conservatism only turns to be welfare improving, if the degree of country-size
asymmetry in the monetary union is not too high26 (nH < 0.7 by inspection of
Table 5).
In the presence of binding government budget constraints, delegating mon-
etary policy to a conservative central bank gains an additional rationale: it can
also mitigates distortions generated by the lack of fiscal and monetary commit-
ment, which are important in this policy scenario. Intuitively, an inflation-averse
central bank is more eﬀective in controlling inflation expectations and, thus, it
may improve the short-run trade-oﬀ between inflation and output. However,
central bank conservatism can have a perverse eﬀect as it may strengthen the
incentives to reduce the permanent eﬀects on debt and real welfare-relevant
variables, amplifying the time-consistency problems of monetary and fiscal poli-
cies; moreover, it may exacerbate the strategic interactions between fiscal and
monetary authorities due to the conflict of objectives. In fact, our experiments
suggest that the desirability of monetary conservatism is ambiguous and that it
depends on the timing of policy moves (fiscal leadership vs. monetary leader-
ship), on the country-size asymmetry, and on the magnitude of the steady-state
debt-to-output ratios, for instance.
With country-size symmetry, the comparison of the welfare losses under the
benevolent and the conservative central bank (Table 6) shows that the latter de-
livers a worse stabilization outcome, except under fiscal leadership. In this case,
fiscal authorities, internalizing that monetary policy could be less debt accom-
modative and over-reactive to inflationary consequences, moderate their free-
riding behaviours.27 Looking at the discretionary policy feedback coeﬃcients
on shocks, a weight-conservative scenario accentuates the budgetary accommo-
dation stance of the monetary policy, particularly under monetary leadership
(cf. Table 8). Even so, inflation variability diminishes, with the assistance of
26The conservative central bank moderates the large country’s fiscal policy reaction to
shocks, but it exacerbates the small country’s fiscal policy.
27We have also computed the welfare losses when fiscal authorities cooperate against a
conservative central bank and when all policymakers share the same inflation-averse policy
objective. The losses under all these policy scenarios are higher than under the correspondent
benevolent scenarios. These results are available upon request
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the tax rates, but the welfare gains only emerge, when a conservative central
bank contributes to reduce meaningful distortions generated by home-biased
fiscal policy objectives, under fiscal leadership.
In general, these results also apply to the case of country-size asymmetry:
delegating monetary policy to a conservative central bank improves the welfare
of the union only under fiscal leadership. However, in this case, the incentives
each fiscal authority faces do not parallel and, therefore, the welfare implications
do not spread proportionally across countries. For instance, with our calibration,
a conservative central bank may produce welfare gains for the union as a whole
and for its small countries at expenses of a worse stabilization performance for
the larger ones (cf. Table 6).28 Apparently, the presence of a conservative
central bank reduces the strategic power of the larger country.
3 Concluding Remarks
This work explored the interactions between monetary and fiscal stabilization
policies in a micro-founded macroeconomic dynamic model for a monetary union
with country-size asymmetry, under two fiscal policy scenarios — with and with-
out debt constraints. We assessed how country-size asymmetry and the need to
ensure fiscal policy solvency shape the strategic interactions between monetary
and fiscal policies and determine welfare stabilization evaluation of the diﬀerent
policy regimes.
We concluded that it may be misleading to use the simplifying assumption of
balanced budget fiscal policies in the analysis of the monetary and fiscal policy
interactions under discretion. Debt raises substantially the problems of time-
inconsistency and, by introducing additional sources of strategic interactions, it
crucially aﬀects the structure of incentives for the small and the large countries.
We found that small countries perform more active fiscal policies than large
countries. Moreover, while in the balanced-budget scenario, macroeconomic sta-
bilization is the only common policy concern of fiscal and monetary authorities,
in the presence of government indebtedness, the latter optimally specializes on
debt stabilization. We also found that policy cooperation is welfare increasing
for the monetary union as a whole. When no debt constraints apply, incentives
to free-ride prevail for the small countries, but cooperation dominates for the
larger ones; thus, the best outcome for the union is more likely to emerge. How-
ever, in the second scenario, indebted large countries may strongly oppose to
this arrangement in favour of fiscal leadership: given their large strategic power
in face of a monetary policy that accommodates debt stabilization. In this case,
delegation of monetary policy to a more conservative central bank could be a
fruitful device to improve the welfare of the union.
28The gains of a conservative central bank under fiscal leadership are highly dependent on
the type of shocks that prevail on the economies and on the degree of their persistence. For
instance, for degrees of persistence of the technology shocks below 0.7, the conservative central
bank impinges higher welfare costs on the union and on their large countries in spite of the
better stabilization performance of the small countries.
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In future work we intend to derive the benevolent non-cooperative country-
specific loss functions and, additionally, include micro-founded political economy
motivations to mimic the current behaviour of fiscal policy authorities. Other
extension stems from the need to represent more realistically a monetary union
composed by many small countries and few large ones. A two-country model, as
we have used as a good starting point for representing a monetary union with
country-size asymmetry, can be improved by describing part of the union as a
continuum of small open economies, as Gali and Monacelli (2007) do for the
whole monetary union. In the EMU, the majority of the country-members are
small comparing to the union as a whole, and so, taken in isolation, their policy
decisions have very little impact.
Appendix: Monetary leadership and Nash be-
tween the fiscal authorities
This appendix summarizes the iterative dynamic programming algorithm for
the discretionary monetary leadership case when fiscal authorities play a Nash
between them. This is an extension of the algorithms developed by Oudiz and
Sachs (1985) and Backus and Driﬃll (1986) and popularized by Söderlind (1999).
It closely follows the one developed by Kirsanova et al. (2005).
There are five strategic agents in the game: three explicit players - the mon-
etary and the two fiscal authorities - and two implicit players - the private sector
of both countries - that always act in last. In this type of game, the monetary
authority moves first and sets the interest rate. Then the two fiscal authorities
decide the levels of their fiscal policy instruments. Finally, the private sector in
both countries reacts being the ultimate follower.
To solve this type of game, one inverts the order of playing and begins by
solving the optimization of the last player, ending up with the optimization of
the leader (the first player). The private sector’s optimization problem is already
solved out - the system of equations in section 2 - and can be represented by
the following system, written in a state space form:
eA0 · In1 On1xn2On2xn1 Hn2xn2
¸ ·
Yt+1
EtXt+1
¸
= eA · Yt
Xt
¸
+ eB · UHt
UFt
¸
+ eDUMt + eCeεt+1
(43)
where Yt is an n1-vector of predetermined state variables, Y0 is given, and
Xt are the eﬀective instruments of the private sector, an n2-vector of non-
predetermined or forward-looking variables (n = n1 + n2 ). The policy in-
struments are represented by UHt , U
F
t and U
M
t . U
H
t and U
F
t stand for the
instruments of the followers which are, respectively, the Home and the Foreign
fiscal authorities, while UMt represents the instrument of the leader, which is
the monetary authority. εt+1 is an nε-vector of exogenous zero-mean iid shocks
with an identity covariance matrix. Premultiplying (43) by eA−10 we get
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·
Yt+1
HEtXt+1
¸
= A
·
Yt
Xt
¸
+B
·
UHt
UFt
¸
+DUMt + Cεt+1 (44)
where A = eA−10 eA, B = eA−10 eB, D = eA−10 eD and C = eA−10 eC. The covariance
matrix of the shocks to Yt+1 is CC 0 and matrices A, B, C, and D are partioned
conformably with Yt and Xt as
A ≡
·
A11 A12
A21 A22
¸
; B ≡
·
B11 B12
B21 B22
¸
D ≡
·
D1
D2
¸
; C ≡
·
C1
O
¸
A common special case is when H ≡ I, but in general this matrix need not
to be invertible. This system describes the evolution of the economy as observed
by policymakers.
The followers’ optimization problem
In the discretionary case, the three policymakers reoptimize every period by
taking the process by which private agents form their expectations as given - and
where the expectations are consistent with actual policies (Söderlind 1999). The
two Nash fiscal authorities minimize their loss functions treating the monetary
policy instrument as parametric but incorporating the reaction functions of the
private sectors. Assuming that the fiscal authority of the Home country has the
following objective function:
1
2
E0
∞X
t=0
βt
³
GH
0
t Q
HGHt
´
=
1
2
E0
∞X
t=0
βt
¡
Z 0tQHZt + Z 0tPHUt + U 0tPH0Zt + U 0tRHUt
¢
(45)
where GH
0
t is the target variables for the Home fiscal authority while Q
H is
the corresponding matrix of weights. The target variables can be rewritten in
terms of the predetermined and non-predetermined state variables collected on
vector Zt, in terms of the policy instruments (Ut) and in terms of combinations
of these two variables.
The fiscal authority in H optimizes every period, taking into account that she
will be able to reoptimize next period. The model is linear-quadratic, thus the
solution in t+ 1 gives a period return which is quadratic in the state variables,
WHt+1 ≡ Y
0
t+1S
t+1
H Yt+1 +w
H
t+1, where S
t+1
H is a positive semidefinite matrix and
wHt+1 is a scalar independent of Yt+1. Moreover, the forward looking variables
must be linear functions of the state variables, Xt+1 = −Nt+1Yt+1. Hence, the
value function of the fiscal authority of H in t will then satisfy the Bellman
equation:
WHt = min
UHt
1
2
£¡
Z0tQHZt+Z 0tPHUt+U 0tPH0Zt+U 0tRHUt
¢
+βEt
¡
WHt+1
¢¤
(46)
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s.t. EtXt+1 = −Nt+1EtYt+1, WHt+1 ≡ Y
0
t+1S
t+1
H Yt+1+w
H
t+1, eq. (44) and Yt given.
Rewriting the system by using EtXt+1 = −Nt+1EtYt+1 Using the expres-
sion above to substitute into the upper block of (44), we get
EtXt+1 = −Nt+1
£
A11Yt +A12Xt +B11UHt +B12U
F
t +D1U
M
t
¤
while the lower block of (44) is
HEtXt+1 = A21Yt +A22Xt +B21UHt +B22U
F
t +D2U
M
t
Multiplying the former equation by H, setting the result equal to the latter
equation and solving for Xt we obtain
Xt = -(A22+HNt+1A12)
−1 (A21+HNt+1A11)| {z }
Jt
Yt-(A22+HNt+1A12)
−1 (B21+HNt+1B11)| {z }
KHt
UHt
-(A22+HNt+1A12)
−1
(B22+HNt+1B12)| {z }
KFt
UFt -(A22+HNt+1A12)
−1
(D2+HNt+1D1)| {z }
KMt
UMt
Xt = −JtYt −KHt UHt −KFt UFt −KMt UMt (47)
where Jt is n2xn1, KHt is n2xkH , K
F
t is n2xkF and K
M
t is n2xkM (kH and kF
stand respectively for the number of fiscal policy instruments of H and F, while
kM stands for the number of monetary policy instruments)29 .
The evolution of Yt Use (47) in the first n1 equations in the system(44) to
get the reduced form evolution of the predetermined variables
Yt+1 = [A11 −A12Jt]| {z }
OYt
Yt +
£
B11 −A12KHt
¤| {z }
OHt
UHt
+
£
B12 −A12KFt
¤| {z }
OFt
UFt +
£
D1 −B12LFt
¤| {z }
OMt
UMt + C1εt+1
Yt+1 = OYtYt +OHtU
H
t +OFtU
F
t +OMtU
M
t + C1εt+1 (48)
Being a follower, the Home fiscal authority observes monetary authority’s ac-
tions and reacts to them. In a linear-quadratic setup, the optimal solution
belongs to the class of linear feedback rules of the form:
29 It is assumed that A22 +HNt+1A12 is invertible.
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UHt = −FHt Yt − LHt UMt (49)
where FHt denotes feedback coeﬃcients on the predetermined state variables
and LHt is the leadership parameter. The other fiscal authority solves a similar
problem and get:
UFt = −FFt Yt − LFt UMt (50)
Being in a Nash game, the two fiscal authorities do not respond to each other’s
actions.
The monetary leadership authority takes into account these fiscal policy
reaction functions as well as the private sector’s optimal conditions, when solves
its optimization problem. Thus, the leader can manipulate the follower by
changing its policy instrument. The monetary leadership reaction function takes
the form of:
UMt = −FMt Yt (51)
Reformulated optimization problem Therefore we can substitute eqs.
(47) and (48) into (46) to obtain an equivalent minimization problem30:
2fWHt ≡ min
UHt
n
Y 0t
£
QSH + βO
0
YtS
t+1
H OYt
¤
Yt + UH
0
t
h
US,H0H + βO0HtSt+1H OYt
i
Yt
+Y 0t
h
US,HH + βO0YtSt+1H OHt
i
UHt + U
F 0
t
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i
Yt
+Y 0t
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UFt + U
M 0
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i
Yt
+Y 0t
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i
UMt + U
H0
t
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RS,HH + βO0HtSt+1H OHt
i
UHt
+UF
0
t
h
RS,HF + βO0FtSt+1H OFt
i
UFt + U
M 0
t
h
RS,HM + βO0MtSt+1H OMt
i
UMt
+UH
0
t
h
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F 0
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h
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i
UHt
+UH
0
t
h
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i
UMt + U
M 0
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h
PS,H0HM + βO0MtSt+1H OHt
i
UHt
+UF
0
t
h
PS,HFM + βO0FtSt+1H OMt
i
UMt + U
M 0
t
h
PS,H0FM + βO0MtSt+1H OFt
i
UFt
o
(52)
where
30We have make use of the fact that wHt+1 is independent of Yt+1 and Etεt+1 = 0.
30
QSH = QH11 − J
0
tQH21 −QH12Jt + J
0
tQH22Jt
US,HH = J
0
tQH22KHt −QH12KHt + PH12 − J
0
tPH22
US,HF = J
0
tQH22KFt −QH12KFt + PH13 − J
0
tPH23
US,HM = J
0
tQH22KMt −QH12KMt + PH11 − J
0
tPH21
RS,HH = KH0t QH22KHt −KH0t PH22 − PH022 KHt +RH22
RS,HF = KF 0t QH22KFt −KF 0t PH23 − PH023 KFt +RH33
RS,HM = KM 0t QH22KMt −KM 0t PH21 − PH021 KMt +RH11
PS,HHF = KH0t QH22KFt −KH0t PH23 − PH022 KFt +RH23
PS,HHM = KH0t QH22KMt −KH0t PH21 − PH022 KMt +RH21
PS,HFM = KF 0t QH22KMt −KF 0t PH21 − PH023 KMt +RH31
Hence, the problem faced by the Home fiscal authority has been transformed to
a standard linear-quadratic regulator problem without forward looking variables
but with time varying parameters. The first-order condition is
0 =
h
US,H0H + βO0HtSt+1H OYt
i
Yt +
h
RS,HH + βO0HtSt+1H OHt
i
UHt
+
h
PS,HHF + βO0HtSt+1H OFt
i
UFt +
h
PS,HHM + βO0HtSt+1H OMt
i
UMt
Since UHt = −FHt Yt − LHt UMt and UFt = −FFt Yt − LFt UMt , the first-order
condition can be solved for the feedback coeﬃcients of the reaction function of
the Home fiscal authority:
FHt ≡
h
RS,HH + βO0HtSt+1H OHt
i−1

h
US,H0H + βO0HtSt+1H OYt
i
−
h
PS,HHF + βO0HtSt+1H OFt
i
FFt
(53)
LHt ≡
h
RS,HH + βO0HtSt+1H OHt
i−1

h
PS,HHM + βO0HtSt+1H OMt
i
−
h
PS,HHF + βO0HtSt+1H OFt
i
LFt
(54)
Finding the recursive equation for StH Substituting the decision rules
(49) , (50) and (51) into (52) we obtain the recursive equations for
StH ≡ TH0,t + βTH0t St+1H THt (55)
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TH0,t = Q
S
H − US,HH
¡
FHt − LHt FMt
¢
−
¡
FHt − LHt FMt
¢0 US,H0H − US,HF ¡FFt − LFt FMt ¢
−
¡
FFt − LFt FMt
¢0 US,H0F − US,HM FMt − FM 0t US,H0M + ¡FHt − LHt FMt ¢0RS,HH ¡FHt − LHt FMt ¢
+
¡
FFt − LFt FMt
¢0RS,HF ¡FFt − LFt FMt ¢+ FM 0t RS,HM FMt
+
¡
FHt − LHt FMt
¢0 PS,HHF ¡FFt − LFt FMt ¢+ ¡FFt − LFt FMt ¢0 PS,H0HF ¡FHt − LHt FMt ¢
+
¡
FHt − LHt FMt
¢0 PS,HHMFMt + FM 00t PS,H0HM ¡FHt − LHt FMt ¢
+
¡
FFt − LFt FMt
¢0 PS,HFMFMt + FM 00t PS,H0FM ¡FFt − LFt FMt ¢
and
THt = OYt −OHt
¡
FHt − LHt FMt
¢
−OFt
¡
FFt − LFt FMt
¢
−OMtFMt
Similar formulae can be derived for country F.
The leader’s optimization problem
This part of the problem is the standard optimization problem when the
system under control evolves as
·
Yt+1
HEtXt+1
¸
=
·
A11-B11FHt -B12F
F
t A12
A21-B21FHt -B22F
F
t A22
¸ ·
Yt
Xt
¸
+
·
D11-B11LHt -B12L
F
t
D21-B21LHt -B22L
F
t
¸
UMt +Cεt+1
(56)
The monetary authority loss function is
1
2
E0
∞X
t=0
βt
³
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0
t Q
MGMt
´
But, since the leadership integrates the followers’ reaction functions - UHt =
−FHt Yt − LHt UMt and UFt = −FFt Yt − LFt UMt - into its optimization problem,
the leadership’s loss function as to be rewritten in terms of the relevant variables
for the leadership authority. Since


Yt
Xt
UMt
UHt
UFt


=
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−FHt 0 −LHt
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
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Yt
Xt
UMt
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
we can setGM
0
t Q
MGMt =
£
Y 0t X 0t UM 0t
¤ eKM


Yt
Xt
UMt

 where eKM = C0CM 0QMCM| {z }
KM
C
and eKM have to partioned conformably with ¡Y 0t X 0t UM 0t ¢0 .
The iterative procedure
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We start with initial approximation for the monetary policy rule, FM(0), sym-
metric positive definite matrices (usually, identity matrices), S(0)H and S
(0)
F ,
some (e.g. a matrix of zeros) N(0) and solve the follower’s problem, using Eq.
(53− 55) for country H and equivalent equations for country F. We get FH(0) and
LH(0), as well as F
F
(0) and L
F
(0) and updated matrices S
(1)
H and S
(1)
F .We then take
into account the policy reaction functions of fiscal authorities and compute new
matrices in Eq. (56), updated target variable
³
GMt = C
MC ¡Y 0t X 0t UM 0t ¢0´
and solve the problem for the monetary authority. This will give us the mone-
tary policy reaction function, FM(1), and updated matrices N(1) and S
(1)
M . Then,
we again solve the problem for the fiscal authorities to update S(2)H and S
(2)
F and
FH(1), L
H
(1), F
F
(1) and L
F
(1) and so on. The fixed point is found when the policy
rules and the matrices converge towards constants for a given level of tolerance.
Blake and Kirsanova (2007) have examined the existence of multiple dis-
cretionary equilibria in dynamic linear quadratic rational expectations models.
They have concluded that linear quadratic discretionary problems can only have
isolated stable equilibria. Even when the number of stable eigenvalues exceed
the number of pre-determined variables in the model, there is no indeterminacy
because the time-consistency property of the discretionary equilibria rules out
that possibility. However, there could be multiple but isolated discretionary
equilibria. To check this hypothesis (only when the number of explosive eigen-
values is smaller than the number of non-predetermined variables) it is necessary
to initialize the algorithm with diﬀerent matrices and see if the solutions ob-
tained are or not distinct.
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Tables and Figures
Baseline: σ=ψ=0.4; ρ=4.5; θ=11; η=0.47; β=0.99; α
H
=α
F
=0.75; ρa = 0.85; n = 0.5
aHt a
F
t µ
H
t µ
F
t a
H
t−1 a
F
t−1 qt−1
it 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
gHt 0.1622 -0.1622 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1532 0.1532 -0.2745
Coop τHt 1.4001 -1.4001 0.0000 0.0000 -1.3224 1.3224 -2.3688
gFt -0.1622 0.1622 0.0000 0.0000 0.1532 -0.1532 0.2745
τFt -1.4001 1.4001 0.0000 0.0000 1.3224 -1.3224 2.3688
it 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
gHt 0.1655 -0.1655 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1600 0.1600 -0.2866
Nash τHt 1.7869 -1.7869 0.0000 0.0000 -1.7855 1.7855 -3.1985
gFt -0.1655 0.1655 0.0000 0.0000 0.1600 -0.1600 0.2866
τFt -1.7869 1.7869 0.0000 0.0000 1.7855 -1.7855 3.1985
it 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
gHt 0.1607 -0.1607 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1481 0.1481 -0.2653
FL τHt 1.7178 -1.7178 0.0000 0.0000 -1.7120 1.7120 -3.0668
gFt -0.1607 0.1607 0.0000 0.0000 0.1481 -0.1481 0.2653
τFt -1.7178 1.7178 0.0000 0.0000 1.7120 -1.7120 3.0668
it 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
gHt 0.1655 -0.1655 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1600 0.1600 -0.2866
ML τHt 1.7869 -1.7869 0.0000 0.0000 -1.7855 1.7855 -3.1985
gFt -0.1655 0.1655 0.0000 0.0000 0.1600 -0.1600 0.2866
τFt -1.7869 1.7869 0.0000 0.0000 1.7855 -1.7855 3.1985
Table 1: Policy reaction functions - balanced-budget, nH = 0.5
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Baseline: σ=ψ=0.4; ρ=4.5; θ=11; η=0.47; β=0.99; α
H
=α
F
=0.75; ρa = 0.85; n = 0.8
aHt a
F
t µ
H
t µ
F
t a
H
t−1 a
F
t−1 qt−1
it 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
gHt 0.0649 -0.0649 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0613 0.0613 -0.1098
Coop τHt 0.5601 -0.5601 0.0000 0.0000 -0.5289 0.5289 -0.9475
gFt -0.2596 0.2596 0.0000 0.0000 0.2452 -0.2452 0.4392
τFt -2.2402 2.2402 0.0000 0.0000 2.1158 -2.1158 3.7900
it -0.0209 0.0209 0.0000 0.0000 0.0205 -0.0205 0.0367
gHt 0.0615 -0.0615 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0489 0.0489 -0.0876
Nash τHt 0.3149 -0.3149 0.0000 0.0000 0.3419 -0.3419 0.6124
gFt -0.2719 0.2719 0.0000 0.0000 0.2746 -0.2746 0.4919
τFt -3.4803 3.4803 0.0000 0.0000 4.0882 -4.0882 7.3232
it -0.0234 0.0234 0.0000 0.0000 0.0234 -0.0234 0.0419
gHt 0.0592 -0.0592 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0422 0.0422 -0.0755
FL τHt 0.2580 -0.2580 0.0000 0.0000 0.4488 -0.4488 0.8040
gFt -0.2704 0.2704 0.0000 0.0000 0.2696 -0.2696 0.4830
τFt -3.4857 3.4857 0.0000 0.0000 4.1320 -4.1320 7.4017
it -0.0021 0.0021 0.0000 0.0000 0.0074 -0.0074 0.0133
gHt 0.0667 -0.0667 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0648 0.0648 -0.1161
ML τHt 0.6477 -0.6477 0.0000 0.0000 -0.6695 0.6695 -1.1993
gFt -0.2667 0.2667 0.0000 0.0000 0.2592 -0.2592 0.4643
τFt -3.1542 3.1542 0.0000 0.0000 3.1011 -3.1011 5.5550
Table 2: Policy reaction functions - balanced-budget, nH = 0.8
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Baseline: σ=ψ=0.4; ρ=4.5; θ=11; η=0.47; β=0.99; α
H
=α
F
=0.75; λ
H
=λ
F
=1; ρa = 0.85; n = 0.5; B/4Y=60%
aHt a
F
t µ
H
t µ
F
t c
w
t a
H
t−1 a
F
t−1 qt−1 b
H
t−1 b
F
t−1
it 0.6826 0.6826 -0.1734 -0.1734 0.2921 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.5733 -0.5733
gHt 0.3391 -0.1862 -0.0497 0.0109 0.0327 -0.2053 0.2053 -0.3678 -0.1644 0.0359
Coop τHt -2.4114 2.0082 1.0910 -0.9886 -0.0863 0.6206 -0.6206 1.1117 3.6068 -3.2681
gFt -0.1862 0.3391 0.0109 -0.0497 0.0327 0.2053 -0.2053 0.3678 0.0359 -0.1644
τFt 2.0082 -2.4114 -0.9886 1.0910 -0.0863 -0.6206 0.6206 -1.1117 -3.2681 3.6068
it 0.7520 0.7520 -0.1911 -0.1911 0.3218 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.6316 -0.6316
gHt 0.3594 -0.2256 -0.0471 0.0131 0.0286 -0.2269 0.2269 -0.4065 -0.1557 0.0433
Nash τHt -0.0943 1.1465 0.5464 -0.8137 0.2251 -1.8627 1.8627 -3.3366 1.8061 -2.6899
gFt -0.2256 0.3594 0.0131 -0.0471 0.0286 0.2269 -0.2269 0.4065 0.0433 -0.1557
τFt 1.1465 -0.0943 -0.8137 0.5464 0.2251 1.8627 -1.8627 3.3366 -2.6899 1.8061
it 0.7524 0.7524 -0.1912 -0.1912 0.3220 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.6320 -0.6320
gHt 0.3396 -0.2056 -0.0437 0.0097 0.0287 -0.1830 0.1830 -0.3278 -0.1445 0.0320
FL τHt 0.3780 0.6837 0.4446 -0.7143 0.2272 -2.6778 2.6778 -4.7968 1.4696 -2.3613
gFt -0.2056 0.3396 0.0097 -0.0437 0.0287 0.1830 -0.1830 0.3278 0.0320 -0.1445
τFt 0.6837 0.3780 -0.7143 0.4446 0.2272 2.6778 -2.6778 4.7968 -2.3613 1.4696
it 0.6932 0.6932 -0.1761 -0.1761 0.2966 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.5823 -0.5823
gHt 0.3627 -0.2208 -0.0479 0.0119 0.0304 -0.2350 0.2350 -0.4210 -0.1584 0.0392
ML τHt -0.3669 1.0894 0.6066 -0.7901 0.1546 -1.5500 1.5500 -2.7766 2.0052 -2.6120
gFt -0.2208 0.3627 0.0119 -0.0479 0.0304 0.2350 -0.2350 0.4210 0.0392 -0.1584
τFt 1.0894 -0.3669 -0.7901 0.6066 0.1546 1.5500 -1.5500 2.7766 -2.6120 2.0052
Table 3: Policy reaction functions - debt, nH = 0.5
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Baseline: σ=ψ=0.4; ρ=4.5; θ=11; η=0.47; β=0.99; α
H
=α
F
=0.75; λ
H
=λ
F
=1; ρa = 0.85; n = 0.8; B/4Y=60%
aHt a
F
t µ
H
t µ
F
t c
w
t a
H
t−1 a
F
t−1 qt−1 b
H
t−1 b
F
t−1
it 1.0921 0.2730 -0.2775 -0.0694 0.2921 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.9173 -0.2293
gHt 0.2274 -0.0745 -0.0432 0.0043 0.0327 -0.0821 0.0821 -0.1471 -0.1428 0.0144
Coop τHt -1.2065 0.8033 0.4979 -0.3954 -0.0863 0.2482 -0.2482 0.4447 1.6459 -1.3072
gFt -0.2978 0.4508 0.0174 -0.0562 0.0327 0.3285 -0.3285 0.5885 0.0574 -0.1859
τFt 3.2131 -3.6163 -1.5817 1.6842 -0.0863 -0.9929 0.9929 -1.7786 -5.2289 5.5676
it 0.9293 0.5793 -0.2338 -0.1495 0.3228 -3.1787 3.1787 -5.6940 -0.7730 -0.4942
gHt 0.1456 -0.0272 -0.0242 -0.0059 0.0253 -0.3065 0.3065 -0.5490 -0.0800 -0.0194
Nash τHt 1.4286 -0.5334 -0.0721 -0.1553 0.1915 -3.5439 3.5439 -6.3482 -0.2384 -0.5135
gFt -0.4296 0.5744 0.0210 -0.0578 0.0310 0.4076 -0.4076 0.7302 0.0694 -0.1910
τFt 6.8594 -5.5344 -1.6558 1.3191 0.2835 -16.9330 16.9330 -30.3325 -5.4738 4.3608
it 0.9368 0.5749 -0.2294 -0.1547 0.3234 -2.9852 2.9852 -5.3476 -0.7584 -0.5113
gHt 0.1364 -0.0178 -0.0226 -0.0075 0.0254 -0.2692 0.2692 -0.4823 -0.0747 -0.0249
FL τHt 1.7470 -0.8120 -0.1151 -0.1225 0.2001 -4.0777 4.0777 -7.3045 -0.3805 -0.4048
gFt -0.4037 0.5484 0.0172 -0.0539 0.0310 0.3051 -0.3051 0.5466 0.0568 -0.1783
τFt 6.1141 -4.7821 -1.5078 1.1694 0.2850 -13.0557 13.0557 -23.3871 -4.9846 3.8657
it 0.6527 0.7404 -0.1957 -0.1582 0.2981 -3.0052 3.0052 -5.3833 -0.6471 -0.5231
gHt 0.1457 -0.0265 -0.0239 -0.0064 0.0255 -0.3578 0.3578 -0.6408 -0.0789 -0.0212
ML τHt 1.2850 -0.4787 -0.0305 -0.1744 0.1725 -3.7175 3.7175 -6.6592 -0.1008 -0.5765
gFt -0.4309 0.5880 0.0230 -0.0629 0.0336 0.3051 -0.3051 0.5465 0.0761 -0.2080
τFt 6.3608 -5.4950 -1.6520 1.4320 0.1853 -14.6393 14.6393 -26.2237 -5.4611 4.7339
Table 4: Policy reaction functions - debt, nH = 0.8
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Baseline:σ=ψ=0.4; ρ=4.5;θ=11; η=0.47;β=0.99; α
H
=α
F
=0.75; λ
H
=λ
F
=1;ρa = ρc = 0.85
Union-wide loss nH = 0.5 nH = 0.55 nH =0.6 nH = 0.65 nH = 0.7 nH = 0.75 nH = 0.8 nH = 0.9
LCoop*100 3.8078 3.7697 3.6555 3.4651 3.1985 2.8558 2.4370 1.3708
LML*100 3.9479 3.9129 3.8075 3.6306 3.3800 3.0526 2.6438 1.5534
LFL*100 3.8942 3.8617 3.7635 3.5973 3.3595 3.0450 2.6470 1.5639
LN*100 3.9479 3.9137 3.8106 3.6371 3.3904 3.0665 2.6599 1.5658
conservative central bank is done for ρ = 0.75; 1− ρ = 0.25
LMLconservative 3.9479 3.9129 3.8075 3.6306 3.3800 3.0526 2.6438 1.5534
LFLconservative 3.8523 3.8233 3.7346 3.5822 3.3597 3.0587 2.6694 1.5827
Loss of a representative household country H and F
LHCoop*100 3.8078 3.6989 3.5296 3.2999 3.0097 2.6592 2.2482 1.2449
LHML*100 3.9479 3.9334 3.8441 3.6790 3.4358 3.1114 2.7011 1.5931
LHFL*100 3.8942 3.8829 3.8013 3.6473 3.4173 3.1060 2.7063 1.6046
LHN*100 3.9479 3.9352 3.8490 3.6878 3.4487 3.1278 2.7194 1.6065
LFCoop*100 3.8078 3.8562 3.8442 3.7719 3.6390 3.4458 3.1921 2.5036
LFML*100 3.9479 3.8878 3.7526 3.5407 3.2498 2.8762 2.4148 1.1966
LFFL*100 3.8942 3.8358 3.7067 3.5043 3.2247 2.8622 2.4098 1.1973
LFN*100 3.9479 3.8874 3.7530 3.5429 3.2542 2.8824 2.4216 1.1989
conservative central bank
LHMLconservative 3.9479 3.9334 3.8441 3.6790 3.4358 3.1114 2.7011 1.5931
LHFLconservative 3.8523 3.8238 3.7391 3.5950 3.3839 3.0943 2.7130 1.6214
LFMLconservative 3.9479 3.8878 3.7526 3.5407 3.2498 2.8762 2.4148 1.1966
LFFLconservative 3.8523 3.8226 3.7279 3.5584 3.3033 2.9519 2.4948 1.2346
Table 5: Losses: union-wide, H and F - balanced-budget
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Baseline:σ=ψ=0.4; ρ=4.5;θ=11; η=0.47;β=0.99; α
H
=α
F
=0.75; λ
H
=λ
F
=1;ρa = ρc = 0.85; B/4Y =60%
Union-wide loss nH = 0.5 nH = 0.55 nH =0.6 nH = 0.65 nH = 0.7 nH = 0.75 nH = 0.8 nH = 0.9
LCoop*100 4.8950 4.8533 4.7280 4.5192 4.2269 3.8511 3.3917 2.2225
LML*100 5.0697 5.3056 5.2641 4.9940 4.5837 4.0676 3.4625 2.0293
LFL*100 5.3826 6.2510 5.8882 5.4233 4.8733 4.2497 3.5623 2.0405
LN*100 5.1264 5.9954 5.6737 5.2541 4.7494 4.1681 3.5174 2.0416
conservative central bank is done for ρ = 0.75; 1− ρ = 0.25
LMLconservative 5.2812 5.4786 5.4105 5.1252 4.6957 4.1573 3.5302 2.0665
LFLconservative 5.2958 5.4233 5.3344 5.0430 4.6150 4.0824 3.4638 2.0228
Loss of a representative household country H and F
LHCoop*100 4.8950 4.6041 4.2850 3.9378 3.5624 3.1589 2.7272 1.7795
LHML*100 5.0697 4.2078 3.8818 3.5961 3.2889 2.9435 2.5531 1.6287
LHFL*100 5.3826 3.8105 3.6292 3.4088 3.1435 2.8309 2.4701 1.6067
LHN*100 5.1264 3.7865 3.6356 3.4368 3.1862 2.8819 2.5232 1.6433
LFCoop*100 4.8950 5.1578 5.3925 5.5990 5.7774 5.9276 6.0497 6.2094
LFML*100 5.0697 6.6474 7.3375 7.5900 7.6049 7.4398 7.1002 5.6352
LFFL*100 5.3826 9.2339 9.2766 9.1647 8.9096 8.5062 7.9314 5.9452
LFN*100 5.1264 8.6952 8.7308 8.6292 8.3971 8.0270 7.4944 5.6260
conservative central bank
LHMLconservative 5.2812 4.4176 4.0945 3.7840 3.4398 3.0539 2.6257 1.6530
LHFLconservative 5.2958 4.3213 3.9224 3.5913 3.2549 2.8940 2.5010 1.6053
LFMLconservative 5.2812 6.7754 7.3844 7.6158 7.6261 7.4675 7.1485 5.7886
LFFLconservative 5.2958 6.7701 7.4525 7.7389 7.7884 7.6477 7.3151 5.7806
Table 6: Losses: union-wide, H and F - debt = 0.6
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Baseline:σ=ψ=0.4; ρ=4.5;θ=11; η=0.47;β=0.99; α
H
=α
F
=0.75; λ
H
=λ
F
=1;ρa = ρc = 0.85; B/4Y =80%
Union-wide loss nH = 0.5 nH = 0.55 nH =0.6 nH = 0.65 nH = 0.7 nH = 0.75 nH = 0.8 nH = 0.9
LCoop*100 4.8679 4.8259 4.7001 4.4903 4.1967 3.8191 3.3577 2.1831
LML*100 5.3503 6.2595 5.8606 5.3816 4.8305 4.2134 3.5360 2.0277
LFL*100 5.5226 6.4957 6.0542 5.5346 4.9448 4.2925 3.5855 2.0477
LN*100 5.3746 6.3835 5.9553 5.4529 4.8824 4.2496 3.5608 2.0478
conservative central bank is done for ρ = 0.75; 1− ρ = 0.25
LMLconservative 5.4704 6.3186 5.9989 5.5383 4.9771 4.3356 3.6276 2.0585
LFLconservative 5.3986 5.7262 5.5260 5.1578 4.6777 4.1092 3.4665 2.0030
Loss of a representative household country H and F
LHCoop*100 4.8679 4.5583 4.2243 3.8659 3.4830 3.0757 2.6440 1.7073
LHML*100 5.3503 3.6857 3.5485 3.3607 3.1195 2.8236 2.4721 1.6046
LHFL*100 5.5226 3.5372 3.4255 3.2599 3.0394 2.7638 2.4332 1.6103
LHN*100 5.3746 3.5620 3.4564 3.2947 3.0761 2.8002 2.4671 1.6313
LFCoop*100 4.8679 5.1530 5.4137 5.6500 5.8618 6.0492 6.2122 6.4649
LFML*100 5.3503 9.4052 9.3288 9.1349 8.8228 8.3830 7.7913 5.8363
LFFL*100 5.5226 10.1115 9.9973 9.7591 9.3908 8.8787 8.1951 5.9842
LFN*100 5.3746 9.8320 9.7036 9.4609 9.0970 8.5977 7.9352 5.7964
conservative central bank
LHMLconservative 5.4704 4.2457 3.9919 3.7001 3.3658 2.9877 2.5662 1.6022
LHFLconservative 5.3986 4.0279 3.7292 3.4495 3.1499 2.8181 2.4483 1.5821
LFMLconservative 5.4704 8.8522 9.0093 8.9521 8.7366 8.3795 7.8736 6.1652
LFFLconservative 5.3986 7.8020 8.2211 8.3304 8.2426 7.9826 7.5392 5.7914
Table 7: Losses: union-wide, H and F - debt =0.8
Baseline: σ=ψ=0.4; ρ=4.5; θ=11; η=0.47; β=0.99; α
H
=α
F
=0.75; λ
H
=λ
F
=1; ρa= 0.85; n = 0.5; B/4Y=60%
aHt a
F
t µ
H
t µ
F
t c
w
t a
H
t−1 a
F
t−1 qt−1 b
H
t−1 b
F
t−1
Conservative central bank
it 0.8456 0.8456 -0.2148 -0.2148 0.3618 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.7102 -0.7102
gHt 0.3288 -0.1970 -0.0417 0.0082 0.0282 -0.1840 0.1840 -0.3297 -0.1377 0.0270
FL τHt 0.4267 1.0540 0.4307 -0.8069 0.3168 -2.4089 2.4089 -4.3150 1.4239 -2.6676
gFt -0.1970 0.3288 0.0082 -0.0417 0.0282 0.1840 -0.1840 0.3297 0.0270 -0.1377
τFt 1.0540 0.4267 -0.8069 0.4307 0.3168 2.4089 -2.4089 4.3150 -2.6676 1.4239
it 0.8895 0.8895 -0.2260 -0.2260 0.3807 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.7472 -0.7472
gHt 0.3523 -0.2355 -0.0453 0.0156 0.0250 -0.2119 0.2119 -0.3796 -0.1497 0.0516
ML τHt 0.5041 1.3272 0.4082 -0.8735 0.3918 -2.3922 2.3922 -4.2853 1.3495 -2.8878
gFt -0.2355 0.3523 0.0156 -0.0453 0.0250 0.2119 -0.2119 0.3796 0.0516 -0.1497
τFt 1.3272 0.5041 -0.8735 0.4082 0.3918 2.3922 -2.3922 4.2853 -2.8878 1.3495
Table 8: Policy reaction functions - debt, nH = 0.5, conservative central bank
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Figure 1: Responses to a 1% negative technology shock at H, nH = 0.8 - Coop-
eration vs Nash - Balanced-Budget
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Figure 2: Responses to a 1% negative symmetric technology shock, nH = 0.5,
Commitment vs Discretion - Debt
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Figure 3: Responses to a 1% negative symmetric technology shock, nH = 0.5,
Cooperative discretion
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Figure 4: Responses to a 1% negative technology shock at H, nH = 0.8, Coop-
erative vs Nash - Debt
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